A year after Oct. 7, Israel has the chance to remake its future — for better or worse
This war has been devastating. It’s also created a rare opportunity for peace
Demonstrators hold placards and set off smoke bombs during an anti-government protest in Israel. Photo by Jack Guez / AFP / Getty Images
Columnist Dan Perry October 4, 2024
It is somehow fitting that the High Holidays coincide with one of the grimmest anniversaries in Jewish history: That of Oct. 7, 2023, the day that thousands of Hamas terrorists invaded southern Israel, massacred almost 1,200 people with astonishing barbarity, kidnapped about 250 more and sparked a year of war that now threatens to spiral out of control.
After 12 months of conflict and devastation, Israel’s people are traumatized and its economy battered. And as waves of antisemitism spread around the world, the country stands at a moment of decision that could well define its future.
Israel’s leadership articulated what it does not want reasonably well in 5784, the year that has just passed: It does not want Hamas to remain in power in the Gaza strip, and it also can no longer tolerate the Hezbollah militia arrayed along its northern border. It has pursued the aims of seriously degrading both forces with decent success by military means.
The Gaza strip has been devastated at a Dresden level, and Hamas has been decimated. Both justice and punishment have been generously meted out, at a horrifying cost to civilian lives, especially in Gaza.
But Israel has pointedly failed to outline a vision for what it actually wants for the day after Hamas in Gaza — and that failure is no coincidence. The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is dependent on ultranationalist parties whose raison d’etre is conflict with the Arabs. That government categorically cannot spawn a peace plan.
The vague strategy of removing Hamas without a concrete vision has led to a default that echoes an uncomfortable past—an Israeli military occupation of Gaza, likely to lead to a prolonged insurgency that enables Israel to delay declaring an end to the war.
That prospect brings more than just logistical and security headaches. It raises existential questions about Israel’s democracy and long-term viability as a Jewish state. The reoccupation of would Gaza effectively bring Israel back to a one-state model, which is neither sustainable nor democratic in the long run.
In this scenario, Israel would control Gaza, alongside the West Bank; more than five million Palestinians live in those two territories. These Palestinians would not have Israeli citizenship or voting rights in the government that rules over them — which would be Israel’s.
Israel cannot claim to be a democracy if it aspires to rule over such a huge disenfranchised population.
Down this path lies debilitating isolation from the world; global economic sanctions of the kind suffered by apartheid South Africa in the 1980s; and probably, after a drawn out and extraordinarily painful struggle, the eventual imposition of equal rights — which will lead to a single democratic state that will be called Palestine.
This is not a future supported by most people in Israel — and yet the government is not facing serious opposition. Israelis are more focused on the goal of recovering the 101 hostages who remain in Gaza — many of whom are now presumed dead.
But there is one clear way to avoid this future, which Israelis and their allies should devote their every resource to agitating for: Give the Palestinian Authority civilian control of Gaza. The West Bank-based PA is far from perfect and would need to be revamped. But to this day, it continues security collaboration with Israel that largely keeps the lid on that combustible territory — to the benefit of Israelis and Palestinians alike.
Alongside declaring its willingness to transfer control of Gaza to the PA, Israel should extend an offer of amnesty for the surviving Hamas leaders — a highly conditional amnesty that would only remain valid as long as the group refrains from any further attacks on Israel. Pressure from the international community — particularly the Arab world — would then mount on Hamas to accept the deal and release the hostages. With that done, an international peacekeeping force could enter Gaza to support the PA in maintaining order.
In this scenario, Israel would open formal negotiations with the PA about recognizing a demilitarized but independent Palestinian state, covering Gaza and much of the West Bank. Israel’s justified security fears would be answered by demilitarization, while the Palestinians’ most difficult demands — like receiving the Old City of Jerusalem — could be sidestepped by not requiring an end-of-claims peace agreement. Rather, it would be an interim solution — the only thing possible and a major leap forward.
Such a move would not only stabilize the situation on the ground but would also pave the way for Israel to finalize the long-sought peace deal with Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, could allow the United States to form a strategic alliance of moderate Sunni nations — such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt — to counterbalance Iran.
If Israel were to take this obvious-yet-bold step, it could open the door to a broader realignment in the Middle East. A peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia would send shockwaves across the region and could finally force the international community to get serious about reining in Iran. Tehran’s influence, from its support of Hezbollah to its nuclear ambitions, has long been the primary destabilizing force in the region. With a united front of moderate Sunni states and Israel, backed by U.S. military and diplomatic support, the world could finally deliver an ultimatum: end your support for terror proxies and dismantle your nuclear program, or face devastating consequences.
To be sure, there are many tripwires along this path. But it is a vision that points toward peace, rather than perpetual conflict; it would bolster Israel’s security while also providing dignity and autonomy to the Palestinians.
It would also likely destroy Netanyahu’s government. His calculus is clear. For him, the continuation of the war is politically expedient. The coalition that supports him — made up of far-right and ultra-religious factions — relies on interminable conflict to maintain power. And as long as Israel is at war, Netanyahu can deflect attention from the catastrophic failures of Oct. 7. For a leader like him, constantly moving from crisis to crisis, a larger conflict — such as a war with Iran in 5785 — would suit his political goals perfectly.
Rarely in history have we seen a national leader whose interests diverge so sharply from those of his country. 5785 could be the year in which Israel turns a historic corner, finding a pathway toward peace with its neighbors and restoring its democratic character. Or it could be a year of ever-expanding war, occupation, and internal strife, with a leader who is more focused on his own political survival than the future of the nation he was elected to serve.
So perhaps the most fateful event for Israel in 5785 might be finally finding a way to rid itself of its unpopular yet bafflingly durable leader — an ever-scheming politician who has deployed his undeniable political brilliance for ruinous and selfish ends.
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